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THE EQUITABLE INEQUITABLE:
ADDING PROPORTIONALITY AND
PREDICTABILITY TO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
IN THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2008
I. INTRODUCTION

A scientist develops an amazing new invention - something so
new and useful that the marketplace eagerly waits for it to be
produced. He applies for and receives a series of patents that
cover the invention and its entire related system, and he starts
licensing the technology to other companies that want to use the
technology in their own products. The scientist is financially
successful. However, one company objects to the price, then
debuts its own invention, which is remarkably similar to one of the
scientist's patented inventions. The scientist sues the company for
infringing his patent. After a costly discovery process, it comes to
light that during the application process, the scientist failed to
notify the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") that
he had previously applied for a patent for a small piece of the
system and it was rejected. Because of this, the court declares the
patent unenforceable, and since many of the other parts of the
system relied on the process described in that patent, those related
patents become unenforceable, too. The company successfully
defended itself using inequitable conduct.
Years of the inventor's hard work and ingenuity are lost to a
disproportionately small error of omission because a Federal
district judge determined that the omission was intentional and
material to the prosecution process. This is a common scenario
under the current state of United States patent law. Such errors are
compounded even more when the parties alleging infringement
purchase patents from the inventors - their patents can be deemed
unenforceable for defects in a process to which they were not even
a party. On September 25, 2008, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona tried
to address these and other problems with the introduction of a bill
titled the Patent Reform Act of 2008 ("2008 Act").'
1. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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The bill, which will likely not reach the Senate's legislative
calendar until 2009,2 is a reaction to the issues and concerns raised
with the Patent Reform Act of 2007 ("2007 Act"),3 which passed
the United States House of Representatives on September 7, 2007'
but failed to make it off the Senate floor because its proposed
limits on damages were met with stiff opposition.' Among the
changes that the 2008 Act proposes are revising damages for
infringement to allow for substantial but reasonable remedies for
patent owners, 6 changes for determining the proper judicial
venue,7 and a limit on post-grant opposition proceedings. 8 The
Act also addresses the concerns of the biotechnology industry,9
which, unlike the software and electronics industries, relies on a
small number of patents and has a strong financial interest in it
being difficult to challenge their validity.'0 Ultimately, legislative
patent reform may be some combination of the 2007 Act, the 2008
Act, and possibly a yet-to-come 2009 Patent Reform Act."
The changes to the doctrine of inequitable conduct in the 2008
Act amount to a substantial overhaul of its application. Currently,
the PTO is the only federal agency that relies on the courts to
police breaches of the duty of good conduct in dealings with an
agency. 2 As a result, applicants have to anticipate pleasing at
least two judging bodies in the course of the patent application
process - initially the PTO, and then all future potential challenges
in court, foreseeable or not. The bill proposes making the second
phase of the inequitable conduct inquiry an administrative hearing
of
Kevin
E.
Noonan
to
Patent
Docs,
2. See
Posting
http://patentdocs.typepad.com (Sept. 25, 2008, 23:40 EST).
3. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); see also S.
1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
4. H.R. 1908.
5. See Steve Tobak, Patent Reform Act Stalls in the Senate, CNET NEWS,
May 12, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13555_3-9941241-34.html.
6. See S. 3600.
7. Id. at § 8.
8. See id. at § 5.
9. See IPWatchdog, http://www.ipwatchdog.com (Sept. 25, 2008, 13:46
EST).
Around
in
the
IBM
InfoSphere,
10. Tooling
http://it.toolbox.comiblogs/infosphere/ (Oct. 10, 2008).
11. Id.
12. 154 CONG. REC. S9991 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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in front of the PTO, while allowing applicants to resubmit
corrected applications to the PTO
rather than having the entire
3
unenforceable.
declared
patent
This Article argues that this legislation proposes a positive
change to the application of inequitable conduct because it would
result in decreased litigation and significantly ease penalties for
innocent or immaterial mistakes made during patent prosecution.
By moving away from unenforceability as the only remedy and
instead focusing on patentability, the Act may open the door for
some misconduct. However, the proposed changes add much
needed proportionality and predictability to the doctrine for
patentees and take away the incentive for alleged infringers to
reflexively raise the defense in response to litigation.
The ensuing sections of this Article provide detailed analysis of
the Act and how it affects the historical goals and perceived
problems of inequitable conduct. Part II examines the history of
inequitable conduct from its creation in the 18th century to its
judicial development in the 1940s and 50s and recent judicial
development and legislative attempts at significant reform. Part III
provides detailed examination of the proposed changes in the
Patent Reform Act of 2008. Part IV analyzes the potential
beneficial and harmful effects of the Act and proposes further
changes to meet the needs of all interested parties. Finally, Part V
concludes that Congress should adopt these changes as part of
patent reform.
II. BACKGROUND

This Section examines the development of the doctrine of
inequitable conduct and recent legislative attempts to reform it. Its
four parts focus respectively on the judicial creation of the
doctrine, recent cases involving its successful use as a defense,
judicial criticism of inequitable conduct, and its legislative
precursors.

13. SeeS. 3600, at§ 11.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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A. Development of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
Inequitable conduct is derived from the doctrine of unclean
hands,' 4 an equitable defense stating that the complaining party
cannot be awarded equitable relief, usually an injunction, 5 if it has
engaged in some fraud or misconduct with regard to the subject of
the complaint. 6 Courts do not want to reward litigants that have
behaved badly with relief because they do not want to be seen as
aiding their misconduct."
Inequitable conduct serves two distinct policy purposes: (1)
encouraging patent validity and (2) deterrence of misconduct. 8
Because the prosecution process is conducted ex parte, 9 interested
third parties have a limited ability to submit prior art materials to
the PTO. 2' There is a tremendous duty on applicants and PTO
examiners to ensure that all relevant materials are considered
before a patent is issued. 2' Applicants have the most available
information about their inventions, prior art, and their area of
expertise, so the burden of disclosure falls on them.22 However,
given the high societal costs of bad patents - that is, a monopoly
on what could be an obvious or anticipated invention - there needs
to be an incentive for good faith disclosure and deterrent for
willful, meaningful noncompliance.23
14. Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent
Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 150 (2006).
15. An injunction is a court order commanding or preventing an action.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

800 (8th ed. 2004).

To get an injunction, the

complainant must show that damages are an inadequate remedy and that an
irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted. Id..
16. Mack, supra note 14, at n.20.
17. See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45
(1933).
18. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st
Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 156 (2005).
19. An ex parte proceeding is one that is conducted for the benefit of one
party only, without notice or argument from adverse parties. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

616 (8th ed. 2004).

20. Kevin A. Meehan, Shopping for Expedient, Inexpensive & Predictable

PatentLitigation, 2008 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 102901, *1 (2008).
21. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 18, at 156.
22. Id. at 158.
23. Id.at 156-60.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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1. Statutory Development

Historically, inequitable conduct began as a private cause of
action rather than as a defense. 24 The first U.S. patent law, the
Patent Act of 1790, stated:
any patent which shall be issued in pursuance of
this act, was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon
false suggestion, and motion made to the said court,
within one year after issuing the said patent, but not
afterwards, it shall and may be lawful to and for the
judge ... to repeal such patents.25
The Patent Act of 1793 extended the time limit for filing an
action from one year to three years. 26 Neither Act, however,
required significant examination of claims during the application
process.2 7
The absence of any examination procedure led to widespread
29
fraud and misconduct. 28 The Patent Act of 1836 created the PT0
and attempted to address the problem by charging the PTO

Commissioner 31 with the duty of examining patent applications for
validity. 3' The 1836 Act also changed the process for alleging
improper patent procurement from a cause of action32 to a
defense. 3"
24. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793).
25. Id.
26. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836).
27. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in
PatentLitigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 40 n.14 (1993).
28. See id. at 40-41.
29. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
30. The Commissioner, now known as the Director, supervises or performs
the duties regarding issuance of patents, stipulates the rules for proceedings
before the PTO, and is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the
office. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information
Concerning
Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#uspto
(last
visited Nov. 30, 2008).
31. Patent Act of 1836 § 1.
32. Goldman, supra note 27, at 41.
33. Patent Act of 1836 § 15.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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The next major reform of U.S. patent law, the Consolidated
Patent Act of 1870, broadened the inequitable conduct defense to
include deceit in the application process, stating that defendants
charged with infringement could raise as a defense that "for the
purpose of deceiving the public the description and specification
filed by the patentee in the patent office was made to contain less
than the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or more
than is necessary to produce the desired effect."34
The Patent Act of 1952, the current statement of U.S. patent
law, 5 is silent as to inequitable conduct specifically. It merely
lists defenses against infringement as "[n]oninfringement, absence
of liability for infringement or unenforceability."36 Inequitable
conduct probably falls under the vague language of
"unenforceability," but the Act does not explicitly codify it as a
defense.
2. JudicialDevelopment
Early on, courts required the government to protect the public
from bad patents.37 For example, in United States v. Bell
Telephone Co.38 in 1888, the Supreme Court held that since the
government had given the exclusive market rights to an invention
to the defendant, it was the government's "obligation to protect the
public from the monopoly of the patent which was procured by
fraud."39
Things began to change in 1944 in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co.,4" where the plaintiff, Hartford, wrote a
phony journal article raving about the technological advances of its

34. Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208
(repealed 1952).
35. United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information
Concerning
Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#aws (last visited

Nov. 30, 2008).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
Goldman, supra note 27, at 43.
128 U.S. 315 (1888).
Id. at 367.
322 U.S. 238 (1944).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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method of pouring glass into molds foruse in glass bottles."
Hartford convinced the president of a glass workers' union to put
his name on the article.42 It was published, and it used the article
in support of its patent application for the method.43 When
Hartford sued Hazel-Atlas for infringement of the patent, HazelAtlas argued that it should not be held responsible for infringing a
patent that was obtained by fraud." Not only was it possible that
the PTO had relied on the article when making the decision to
issue the patent, the lower court had referred to it in the earlier
proceeding where Hartford successfully alleged infringement of
the patent.45 The Court reversed the finding of infringement
against Hazel-Atlas and stated, "[t]o grant full protection to the
public against a patent obtained by fraud, that patent must be
vacated. It has previously been decided that such a remedy is not
available in infringement proceedings, but can only be
accomplished in a direct proceeding brought by the government."46
The landmark change in inequitable conduct law arrived in
1945, in Precision Instrument Manufacturing. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co.47
There, the Supreme Court
explicitly derived the inequitable conduct doctrine from "unclean
hands"48 and used it to dismiss an infringement complaint that the
patentee had filed against the defendant.49
In Precision Instrument, the plaintiff alleged infringement of
three of its patents for torque wrenches. 5 ° The defendant
responded with an affirmative defense of "unclean hands,"
specifically that the plaintiff knew the applications for the patents
in question contained statements that it knew to be perjured,
including dates that were falsified to make some of the claims predate a competitor's application.' One of the defendant's officers
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.at 240.
Id.
Id. at 240-41.
See id. at 239.
Id. at 246-47.
Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 251.
324 U.S. 806 (1945).
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 807-09.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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assigned his patent applications to the patentee as part of a
settlement agreement in an earlier dispute, so the defendant
participated in the misconduct that it now claimed rendered the
patents unenforceable. 2 The Supreme Court found that the
patentee clearly should have known, as a party to the earlier
dispute, that the applications were fraudulent on their face. 3 The
Court then needed to determine the proper remedy, because both
parties were potential wrongdoers in this instance - the defendants
for allegedly infringing on the patents, and the plaintiff for
fraudulently obtaining them.
The Court began by determining that the plaintiffs misconduct
offended more than just the PTO or the defendant;54 it offended the
public interest. 5 It committed fraud against the whole of society
because it knowingly withheld information that was important to
the PTO's ability to accurately assess the application and the
importance of the perjury to it. 6 As patents are a rare exception to
the general rule against monopolies, allowing a plaintiff such as
Precision to enforce the patent was against the public policy
favoring open markets. 7 The Court decided not to enforce the
patent by dismissing the complaint.8
In extending unclean hands to inequitable conduct in patent
proceedings, the Court stated:
where a suit in equity concerns the public interest as
well as the private interests of the litigants this
doctrine assumes even wider and more significant
proportions. For if an equity court properly uses the
maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it
not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the
fruits of his transgression but averts an injury to the
52. See id. at 813-14.
53. See PrecisionInstrument, 324 U.S. at 817.
54. Id. at 818.
55. Id. ("Public interest demands that all facts relevant to such matters be
submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence. Only in this way can that agency act to
safeguard the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent monopolies.")

56. See id.
57. Seeid. at816.
58. Id. at 820.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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public."
Precision Instrument, therefore, finally established inequitable
conduct as a definitive defense to infringement.6

3. Post-PrecisionDevelopments
Precision involved a clear case of perjury in the application
process. However, it remained to be determined how courts would
apply the standard to less obvious fraud in the prosecution process.
Presently, a successful claim of inequitable conduct must show
clear and convincing proof of deception, withheld information, or
falsification in the application process that was both (1) material to
the claims of the patent and (2) made with intent to deceive the
PTO.61 If both elements of the test are satisfied, the court then
weighs the two to determine if a finding of inequitable conduct is
necessary:62 a strong showing of materiality will carry a lesser
showing of intent, and vice versa. Because patents carry a
presumption of validity,63 the burden is on the defendant to find,
through discovery, not only material failures in the application
process, but also proof of subjective intent.64
The materiality prong is based on the duty of candor and good
faith imposed on applicants to the PTO.65 Some confusion has
arisen in recent years about what standard to apply to materiality.66
Without guidance from the Supreme Court or the PTO, courts
59. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 815.
60. Goldman, supra note 27, at 51.
61. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
62. Id.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
64. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 438 F.3d 1123,
1133-34 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
65. James Cronin, Comment, Inequitable Conduct and the Standard of
Materiality: Why the Federal Circuit Should Use the Reasonable Patent
ExaminerStandard, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1327, 1335 (2006).
66. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[W]e have not decided whether the standard for materiality in
inequitable conduct cases is governed by equitable principles or by the Patent
Office's rules.").
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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early in the evolution of inequitable conduct used an objective "but
for" test, a subjective "but for" test, and the "but it may have"
test.67 The objective "but for" test found misconduct to be material
if it would have prevented the issuance of the patent.68 The
subjective "but for" test is more broad and looks at whether the
examiner relied on the misconduct in issuing the patent. 69 The
"but it may have" test is even more broad, as it finds materiality in
any misrepresentations that may have affected the examiner during
the course of prosecution.7 °
The two prevalent modem standards are derived from Title 37,
Rule 56 of the Code of Federal Regulations - the pre-1992
version71 and the post-1992 version.72 In 1977, the PTO codified
the standard for materiality in proceedings before the PTO. 73 This
"pre-1992 version" of Rule 56 uses a subjective standard of
whether a reasonable patent examiner would view the disclosures
as material to the claims in the patent.74 In 1992, the PTO
modified Rule 56 to be a more objective standard of whether the
challenged information establishes "a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim. 75 Courts often use the version current
on the effective filing date of the patents at issue,76 but some courts
feel free to apply any of the five materiality standards.7 7 Patentees
67. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
68. Cronin, supra note 65, at 1338-39 (citing In re Multidistrict Litigation
Involving Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 540 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1976)).
69. Id. at 1340.
70. Id. at 1341.
71. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977).
72. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1) (2008).
73. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
74. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977).
75. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1) (2008).
76. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 438 F.3d
1123, 1129 ("Because all of the patent applications at issue in this case were
pending on or filed after March 16, 1992, we look to the current version of Rule
56, rather than the pre-1992 version of the rule.").
77. See Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (stating that neither change to Rule
56 was meant to supplant the other standards used in precedent cases).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4

10

Peters: The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality and Predictabil

2008]

THE EQUITABLE INEQUITABLE

prefer the more stringent test of the post-1992 standard because the
challenged or missing information from the holder's application
must relate directly to patentability."8
With respect to the element of intent, direct evidence of
fraudulent intent is not required to show inequitable conduct."
Intent to deceive can be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. 8" Again, public policy concerns have a substantial
impact on determinations of intent, as courts view the duty to the
PTO and the public as a fiduciary-like duty.8' Courts have
2
struggled with whether bad faith by the applicant is required.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 3 in Norton v. Curtiss4
stated that, "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the fact of
misrepresentation coupled with proof that the party making it had
knowledge of its falsity is enough to warrant drawing the inference
that there was a fraudulent intent." 5 The Federal Circuit has held,
however, that honest mistakes should not be punished86 and
grossly negligent behavior is not always enough, by itself, to
support an inference of deceitful intent.87
B. Application of Modern InequitableConduct Doctrine
The penalties for inequitable conduct are severe. A finding of
inequitable conduct as related to a single claim in a patent renders

78. Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Containment, 7 J.
L. 325, 331 (2008).
79. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd.,394 F.3d
1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.

80. Id.
81. Goldman, supra note 27, at 63.

82. See id. at 62.
83. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals heard appeals in patent cases
until the Federal Circuit was created in 1982. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387
(8th ed. 2004).
84. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

85. Id. at 795-96 (emphasis added).
86. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Systems Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166
(Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Wholly inadvertent errors or honest mistakes . . . do not
constitute the requisite level of intent." (citing Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto
Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1971))).
87. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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all claims unenforceable. 88 Additionally, any other patents that
rely on the patent in question may also be unenforceable.89
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd.9"
illustrates the harsh consequences of the inequitable conduct
doctrine. 9' In ConsolidatedAluminum, the plaintiff patentee sued
four parties for infringement of six patents related to ceramic foam
filters used with molten metals.92 The defendants charged the
patentee with inequitable conduct in the process of procuring one
of the patents.93 The court agreed, stating that the evidence94
showed a clear inference that the inventors knew the best mode
for practicing the invention was omitted from the patent
application. 9' The court found that patent unenforceable, then
invalidated three other patents that relied on the one obtained by
willful withholding of infornation. 96 Even though a special master
in an earlier proceeding felt that the other patents would have been
valid if the patentee disclosed the missing information as prior
art, 97 the Federal Circuit determined that the patentee's hands were
"soiled" by the breach of its duty of good faith and candor before
the PTO. 98 The court declared, therefore, all patents-in-suit were
unenforceable. 99 Thus, one intentional, material misrepresentation
of one aspect of the application for one patent effectively
prevented the company from asserting exclusive market rights to
88. Kingsdown Med. Consultants v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed.

Cir. 1988).
89. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809
(Fed. Cir. 1990).

90. Id.
91. Id. at 806.
92. Id. at 806.
93. Id.
94. Best mode is the best way that the inventor knows to use the invention
described in a patent application. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (8th ed.
2004). Failing to disclose the best mode in an application can render the
application invalid. Id.
95. Consol. Aluminum, 910 F.2d at 807 ("Instead of disclosing the actual

slurry used to make the filters tested and reported in the patent, a fictitious
inoperable slurry was disclosed ... which omitted key ingredients ......
96. Id. at 812.
97. Id. at 812 n.8.
98. Id. at 809.
99. See id. at 812.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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four patents.
Because the court found a strong showing of both materiality
and intent to deceive in ConsolidatedAluminum, the harshness of
the penalty perhaps falls in line with the stated goals of inequitable
conduct. Other cases, however, create concerns that there is an
enormous disparity between the gravity of the misconduct, the
culpability of the patentee during the application process, and the
severity of the penalties.
One such problem occurs when the patentee is not the same
party as the inventor, usually an assignee.' 0 Since assignees are
normally completely unconnected to the prosecution of the patents,
enforcement of their rights can become treacherous when
infringers respond with allegations of wrongdoing. Purchasers
certainly have an opportunity to conduct a "due diligence" inquiry
of all the application materials that are publicly available, but they
have insufficient resources to investigate the inventor or
prosecuting attorney's subjective state-of-mind at the time of the
application. '
Hoffmann-La Roche v. Promega"'2 illustrates this effect on third
party purchasers.0 3 A small biotechnology company developed a
DNA polymerase used to replicate strands of DNA.0 4
The
plaintiff was a giant in the pharmaceuticals industry that purchased
the rights to the patent for $330 million.' 5 The defendant had
licensed the invention from the original patentee, and then, after
the assignment, allegedly breached the license agreement.0 6 The
assignee sued the defendant to enforce its newly-purchased
rights.' O7 The defendant responded to the infringement charges

100. The rights to patents can be transferred like personal property. See 35
U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
101. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent
Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 342 (2006).
102. 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
103. Id. at 1357-58.
104. Id. at 1358.
105. Teresa Riordan, Who First Identified a Key Enzyme in Biotech
Research? Hoffmann-LaRoche Has Money on It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1996, at
D2.
106. Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1358.
107. Id.
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with a counterclaim of inequitable conduct." 8 The defendant
alleged misconduct in the prosecution of a patent it had
presumably relied on when it was selling the invention under the
license agreement.'09
The Federal Circuit held that the patentee described a particular
experiment in the past tense, when evidence showed the procedure
had not been performed as stated in the patent application." The
inventors completed all of the steps listed in the example in a
different sequence as part of two separate procedures, but the court
found the specific order of the steps to be material and the
description of the unperformed experiment to be intentionally
deceptive, despite the fact that the experiment worked as written."'
On remand, the district court determined that the patent was
unenforceable." 2 Thus, inequitable conduct was used to invalidate
a patent, causing potentially enormous economic damage to the
assignee, because fifteen years earlier a different company used an
improper verb tense in the patent application.
Hoffmann-La Roche contained a dissenting opinion that referred
to the application of the defense as a prime example of the
"plague" of inequitable conduct allegations,' " and then suggested
that under this court's application of the doctrine, it would be
nearly impossible for any patent to survive this type of scrutiny.'
Purdue Pharma v. Endo Pharmaceuticals.5 further illustrates
the potentially devastating impact of inequitable conduct on an
otherwise valid patent. In Purdue Pharma, the plaintiff sued for
infringement of three patents covering a pain reliever.16 The
detailed description section of each patent referred to the
revelation that its new formulation of the drug controlled pain in a
narrower range of doses as a "surprising discovery.""' 7 The
108. Id. at 1359.
109. See Riordan, supra note 106.
110. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1366.
111. Id. at 1368.
112. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1011,
1029 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
113. Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372 (Newman, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1381.
115. 410 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
116. Id. at 695.
117. Id. at 694.
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defendant, which wanted to market a generic version of the drug,
focused on this language, and the Federal Circuit affirmed a
district court's determination that the "surprising discovery"
language implied that clinical trials were performed that in fact
were not." 8 The court inferred intent from language that
deliberately suggested the performance of the trials." 9
Despite the validity of the patents, the decision opened the door
for the defendant to market the generic version of the drug because
the plaintiff could no longer enforce its exclusive rights in the
patents. 2 ' The patentee corporation responded by laying off 825
employees (thirty-eight percent of its workforce), because the
once-patented drug accounted for roughly seventy-five percent of
its sales."12 Ultimately, the patentee filed a petition for a rehearing
by the Federal Circuit Court, which was granted. 22 On second
look, the court still found that the evidence satisfied the materiality
prong, but it was such a low degree of materiality that very little
deceptive intent could be inferred from it.1 23 Balanced together,

the misconduct was insufficient to render the patents
unenforceable. 124 Ultimately the parties settled the litigation over
the infringement of the patents, 25 but the narrowly-averted
astronomical financial and human costs of slightly ambiguous
language in this otherwise valid patent application casts into doubt
the equitability of the results.
26
In 2007, McKesson Information Solutions v. Bridge Medical
further muddied the waters of inequitable conduct by expecting a

118. Id. at 698.

119. Id. at701.
120. Id. at 694.
121. Associated Press, Purdue Pharma to Lay Off 825 Employees, July 1,
2005, http://www.pharmacychoice.com/news/article.cfm?ArticleID=8036.
122. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1137 (Fed.

Cir. 2006) (vacating and remanding the judgment regarding finding of
inequitable conduct).
123. Id. at 1134.
124. Id. at 1134-35.
125. Press Release, Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma L.P. Announces
Resolution of OxyContin Lawsuit with Endo Pharmaceuticals (Aug. 28, 2006),
availableat http://www.purduepharma.com/pressroom/news/20060828-1.htm.
126. 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17649 (July 10, 2007).
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large amount of foresight from the patentee during prosecution in
its decision to declare a patent unenforceable. In McKesson, the
patentee sued the defendant for infringement of a patent for a barcode reading system that associated medical information with
specific patients. 27 The defendant alleged inequitable conduct in
the prosecution of the patent and both the district court 12 and the
Federal Circuit agreed. 1
The problem for the patentee arose when it prosecuted three
related patents. 3 ' One PTO examiner (Trafton) evaluated two
applications and a second examiner (Lev) evaluated the third.'
While the court found three instances of failure to disclose
material information, 132 two of them are particularly interesting.
The patentee disclosed the existence of the application that was
pending before Lev to examiner Trafton.'33 Examiner Lev rejected
claims in the application referring to a three-node communication
system in a handheld device, and these claims were related to the
other pending applications. ' While Examiner Trafton was aware
of the other application, the court held that the patentee needed to
explicitly point out the rejected claims to the examiner."'
The third finding of materiality related to the two patents
evaluated by examiner Trafton. The patentee failed to remind
Trafton of some claims in a continuation-in-part patent that were
similar to claims in the pending application, and the Federal
Circuit held that the patentee could not rely on the examiner's
memory of a prior application when determining what information
to disclose in a subsequent application.'36 The court felt that a
reasonable examiner needed to know of the claims to properly
29

127. Id. at 902.
128. Id. at 901.
129. Id. at 926.
130. See id. at 902-07.
131. Id. at 903-06.
132. See McKesson Info., 487 F.3d at 926.
133. Id. at 905.
134. Id. at 904-05.
135. See id. at 917-18.
136. Id. at 925-26 ("[The patentee] was not entitled to assume that Examiner
Trafton would recall his decision ... in the absence of a written disclosure to
that effect.")..
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16

Peters: The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality and Predictabil

2008]

THE EQUITABLE INEQUITABLE

evaluate the possibility of double patenting.'37 Despite the
patentee's disclosure of the entire specification of the pending
patent in the application for the continuation-in-part patent, the
court found no clear error in the district court's finding that the
failure to re-iterate the information was a material and intentional
omission. 138
The effect of these two findings appears to be that applicants
have a clear duty to keep the PTO informed of its own actions
during the course of prosecuting related patents.'39 Any and all
diligence or investigation falls on the duty of the patentee. Judge
Newman's dissenting opinion criticized the majority's decision by
saying "[t]his court returns to the 'plague' of encouraging
unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning the
opportunistic litigation that here succeeded despite consistently
40
contrary precedent." 1
Sometimes, however, patentees engage in truly exceptional
misconduct before the PTO. For example, in Applied Materials,
Inc. v. Multimetrixs, LLC,14 1 the plaintiff filed a complaint to
dispute inventorship of a method for using sensors to determine
the placement of a flat object 142 and during testimony the court
raised the issue of inequitable conduct.' 3 One of the three
inventors appeared to sign responses to the PTO in both 2003 and
2004 - but he died in 2002. 14' Despite an initial filing date of
2001,14 the district court applied the pre-1992 "reasonable
examiner" materiality standard 46 and found clear and convincing
evidence that the true identity of the inventors would be important
137. Id. at925.
138. McKesson Info., 487 F.3d at 926.
139. Posting
of
Kevin
E.
Noonan
to
Patent
Docs,
http://patentdocs.typepad.com! (May 23, 2007, 23:53 EST) ("[T]he Federal
Circuit's decision is properly understood to impose the additional requirement
that an applicant (or her counsel) take affirmative steps to bring such parallel
prosecution to the attention of each examiner in related applications.")
140. McKesson Info., 487 F.3d at 926-27 (Newman, J. dissenting).
141. No. C 06-07372, 2008 WL 2892453 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2008).
142. Id. at *1.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id. at *4.
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to a reasonable examiner 4 7 and that the defendants inexplicably
forged his signature rather than correcting the application and
submitting true information to the PTO.'48 The two separate
instances of forgery were evidence of a clear intent to deceive the
office,' 4 9 and the court declared the patent in question
unenforceable. 5 o
In 2007, 95 out of 357 patent suits with reported decisions
(twenty-six percent) involved a determination of inequitable
conduct.' 5' These numbers only reflect proceedings where a final
judgment relating to inequitable conduct was entered. The patent
owner prevailed fifty-five times and the alleged infringer prevailed
forty times. 52 These figures raise important concerns regarding
the necessity of both these kinds of challenges and the harsh
remedy of making all the claims on all related patents
unenforceable.
C. Judicial Commentary
In evaluating claims of inequitable conduct, courts have often
used strong language to condemn its current application, in
particular by dissenting judges in cases where patents were held
unenforceable. The automatic raising of the defense was first
referred to as a "plague" in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco
Corp."' The Federal Circuit wrote:
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in
almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel
compelled to make the charge against other
reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to
147. Applied Materials, 2008 WL 2892453, at *5 ("That the
misrepresentations did not relate to patentability does not change the court's
conclusion that the forged signatures are material.")
148. Id. at *9.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *10.
151. Patstats.org, http://www.patstats.org/2007 full year.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2008).
152. Id.
153. 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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represent their client's interests adequately,
perhaps. . . . They destroy the respect for one
another's integrity, for being fellow members of an
honorable profession, that used to make the bar a
valuable help to the courts in making a sound
disposition of their cases, and to sustain the good
name of the bar itself.... The charge was formerly
known as "fraud on the Patent Office," a more
pejorative term, but the change of name does not
make the thing itself smell any sweeter. 154
55

In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,.
Judge Rader's dissent to a finding of the patentee's inequitable
conduct referred to the remedy of unenforceability as an "atomic
bomb," 156 and pointed out that its purpose is to incentivize candor
before the PTO rather than become a tool of litigators. The dissent
stated:
[t]he allegation of inequitable conduct opens new
avenues of discovery; impugns the integrity of
patentee, its counsel, and the patent itself; excludes
the prosecuting attorney from trial participation
(other than as a witness); and even offers the trial
court a way to dispose of a case without the rigors
of claim construction and other complex patent
doctrines. 57
'

He then continued to criticize the court's decision to find both
materiality and intent in the inventor's inadvertent omission of
information while assisting the attorney during prosecution
because the inventor revealed the missing information to the PTO,
thus contradicting a finding of intent to deceive. 158

154. Id. at 1422.
155. 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25103 (Sept. 25, 2008).
156. Id. at 1349 (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
157. Id. at 1349-50.
158. See id. at 1350-52.
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D. Recent Attempts at Legislative Reform
Congress has recognized a need for patent reform by introducing
legislation to that end in each of the last four years. However,
achieving that reform faces many significant obstacles.
Biotechnology and information technology companies have
competing interests in patent law,'5 9 and each group wants its
interests to be represented in any new legislation.'60 This section
will examine congressional attempts to reform the doctrine of
inequitable conduct in both 2005 and 2007.
1. The Patent Reform Act of 2005
On June 8, 2005, Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas
introduced The Patent Reform Act of 2005 ("2005 Act").' 6' It
attempted to enact several recommendations from studies
conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 162 and the
National Academy of Sciences.'63 The bill was never enacted. 6"
The 2005 Act attempted to codify the duty of good faith and
candor in proceedings before the PTO and shift the whole of the
burden of inequitable conduct decisions from the federal courts to
the PTO. 165 Such a change in forum would likely meet some level
of resistance due to the substantial extra funding that would be
required. 166 However, the Act proposed narrowing when the
defense of inequitable conduct may be asserted from all litigation

159. See Holman, supra note 101, at 337.
160. See John Markoff, Two Views of Innovation, Colliding in Washington,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, § 3, at 3.
161. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
162. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 4-7 (2003), available

at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/irmovationrpt.pdf.

163. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3-13 (Stephen A. Merrill, et al. eds. 2004), available at

http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf.
164. Patently-O, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/ (Dec. 8, 2005, 09:50 EST).

165. H.R. 2795, at § 5.
166. James G. McEwen, Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease? An Overview

of the Patent Reform Act of 2005, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 55, 74
(2005).
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involving current patent owners to four specific scenarios, namely
when: (1) the conduct relates to the validity of a claim, (2) the
court previously found that claim invalid, (3) the patent examiner
relied on the misconduct, and (4) the patent holder is responsible
for the fraud. 67
'
2. The PatentReform Act of 2007

With the 2005 bill and a similar bill introduced in 200668 failing
to come up for a vote, Congressman Howard Berman of California
and Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced the Patent
Reform Act of 2007.169 While many provisions were substantially
similar to the 2005 bill, the change to inequitable conduct was
noticeably absent from the Senate bill. In introducing the Senate
version of the bill with Senator Leahy, Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah lamented the missed opportunity for change:
Attorneys well know that the inequitable conduct
defense has been overpleaded and has become a
drag on the litigation process. I think last year's
language struck the correct balance by focusing on
the patentability of the claims in dispute and
properly prevented parties from asserting the
defense frivolously ....

I believe that reforms to the

inequitable conduct defense should focus on the
nature of the misconduct and not permit the
unenforceability of a perfectly valid patent on a
170
meritorious invention.
The Senate version of the bill never reached a vote because the
legislators could not come to an agreement on the provisions for
damages in the bill.' However, the House version of the bill was

167.
168.
169.
Reform
170.
Hatch).

H.R. 2795, at § 5.
Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006).
Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent
Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
153 CONG. REc. S4691-92 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen.

171. Dugie Standeford, US Patent Reform Stalls as Senate Negotiations
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passed on September 7, 2007.172 The bill contained a section
specifically included to address concerns about inequitable
conduct. 173
First, the new section reiterated that any allegations of
inequitable conduct must be pled with particularity in conformance
with Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 174 a rule
that is already applied by the courts.175 This should weed out any
inherently frivolous claims before they begin to rack up significant
discovery costs. Second, it reverted to the subjective "reasonable
examiner" test, in direct contradiction with the objective test
preferred by the PTO's post-1992 Rule 56 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. 176 Finally, the bill required that intent no longer be
inferred solely from a finding of materiality. 1 This addressed the
problem of courts automatically deducing intent from a strong
showing of materiality, which then required an application of the
balancing test and ultimately resulted in more, and possibly more
questionable, findings of inequitable conduct.
77

III. THE CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION
On September 25, 2008 Senator Kyl of Arizona introduced the
Patent Reform Act of 2008.178 Though the bill is unlikely to
receive consideration before 2009,171 it is significant because it
proposes yet another way of overhauling inequitable conduct.
These proposed changes represent a substantial shift away from
both existing judicially-created law and the recent attempts to
codify the doctrine. The changes to inequitable conduct are
Break Down, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Apr. 15, 2008, availableat http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1007&print--l.
172. H.R. 1908.
173. Id. at § 12.
174. Id. at § 12(b)(3)(B).
175. See, e.g., UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07 CV 2582,

2008 WL 5142194, at *1, (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2008) ("Inequitable conduct must
meet the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 9(b).").
176. H.R. 1908, at § 12(b)(4).
177. Id.
178. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008).
179. See
Posting
of
Kevin
E.
Noonan
to
Patent
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/ (Sept. 25, 2008, 23:40 EST).
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codified in proposed additions to the end of Chapter 29 of Title 35
of the United States Code. 8 ' This section will examine the
proposed changes to the doctrine in depth, first by looking at the
proposed statutory changes and then through Senator Kyl's
testimony before the Senate.
A. The Statutory Changes

Of the two recent attempts at patent reform, the 2008 Act is
more similar to the sweeping changes advocated by the 2005 bill,
which attempted to completely remove the inequitable conduct
defense from the courts and place the entire burden on the PTO.
The 2008 Act suggests leaving the initial burden with the courts
and moving subsequent proceedings to the PTO. 8 ' The bill
proposes:
If a court in a civil action, upon motion of a party to
the action, finds that it is more likely than not that a
person who participated in a matter or proceeding
before the Office knowingly and intentionally
deceived the Office by concealing material
information or by submitting false material
information in such matter or proceeding, the court
shall order the patent to be made the subject of a
reissue application under section 251. The motion
shall set forth any basis upon which the moving
party contends 1 or more claims of the patent are
invalid in view of information relating to the
conduct at issue not previously considered by the
Director. 82
'
If a court finds inequitable conduct, it must issue an order
specifying the facts used to come to that conclusion.'83 The facts
in the order cannot be used in any other proceedings.' 84 Since the
180. See S. 3600, at § 11(a).
181.
182.
183.
184.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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district court's ruling is not subject to appellate review,' 85 the
proposed change removes the Federal Circuit from the equation
unless there is an appeal of the outcome of the subsequent reissue
proceeding. 86
'
The proposed reissue application is a new feature absent from
prior statutory proposals. While this proposal alone still allows for
frequent assertion of inequitable conduct in the courts, the reissue
procedure gives patent owners a second chance to avoid the severe
consequences of unenforceability by limiting that sanction to cases
of fraud. 8 7 Any and all remedies are now within the scope of the
PTO.
The reissue proceeding gives the patentee two months to
resubmit the application for the patent in question or the court
enters a judgment by default that the patent is unenforceable.' 88 If
owners choose to resubmit the application, they are not limited to
modifying the claims in question.189 Instead, the Act proposes
allowing owners to make some changes and bring new information
to the attention of the PTO. 90
'
The patentee must, at a minimum, submit a statement to the
PTO addressing the alleged misconduct. 91 The statement "shall
identify with specificity the issues of patentability arising from the
information and the basis upon which the claims in the reissue
application are believed by the applicant to be patentable
'
notwithstanding the information." 92
Additionally, the patentee
can eliminate claims from the application, and applicants can also
substitute one claim of "equivalent or 1narrower
scope replacing
93
any omitted claim of the original patent."
The PTO then evaluates the patent using these new materials in
addition to all the information submitted during the original
185. Id.
186. S. 3600, at § 11(a).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See id ("A patentee may request reissue of a patent on the basis of
information not previously considered by the Director in connection with a
patent, or the efforts to obtain such patent ....
191. Id.
192. S. 3600, at § 11 (a).
193. Id.
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prosecution of the patent.'94 Upon reconsideration of the patent in
light of the misconduct found by the court and any modifications
made by patent owner, the PTO can either reissue a modified
patent or require the patentee to surrender it.'95 If the patent is
reissued, then the proceeding terminates and no sanctions are
imposed on the patentee. 196
The PTO may add financial penalties if it orders the surrender of
the patent. If the office determines that there is probable cause that
an applicant engaged in material, intentionally deceptive conduct
before the office, it can order such sanctions.' 97 In weighing the
amount, the Director must consider the materiality of the
misconduct and the impact of it on both the particular proceeding
and the integrity of the PTO.'98 Sanctions may be up to $150,000
for each individual act of misconduct, up to $1 million for a
pattern of misconduct, or, for truly egregious actions, the office
can declare one or more claims of the patent to be unenforceable
or impose a penalty of up to $10 million.'99 These fines are also
subject to joint and several liability,2 °° meaning that an attorney or
law firm with an indigent client can be responsible for the entirety
of these amounts.2 '
It is important to note that the office can declare one or more
claims unenforceable. This provision changes the existing system,
where the entire patent and all other patents that rely on it are
unenforceable if there is any material and intentional misconduct
found by the court relating to claim in the patent.2 2 Even in cases
194. Id.

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. S. 3600, at § 11 (a).

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Joint and several liability is liability that may be apportioned either

among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of the group,
at the adversary's discretion. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 2004).
Thus, each liable party is individually responsible for the entire obligation, but a
paying party may have a right of contribution and indemnity from nonpaying
parties. Id.
202. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1330-31
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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of exceptional fraud, the entire patent would not necessarily be
unenforceable under the Act, and those cases of exceptional fraud
are the only instances that would render any of the individual
claims unenforceable.
The Act leaves the initial district court proceeding largely the
same, with one notable exception. The Act defines materiality as
information that is "not part of the record or cumulative to
information in the record and either establishes that a patent claim
is not patentable or refutes a position that the applicant or patent
owner took in response to a rejection of the claim as
unpatentable. 2 °3 This is the post-1992 standard for materiality,
meaning that for a court to find material misconduct it would now
have to use the same standard that the PTO uses.
The 2008 Act also, unlike the 2005 Act, allows for misconduct
allegations to go forward even if the patent in the litigation is
being enforced by a purchaser that was not a party to the original
application, although sanctions are reserved for those that were
party to the misconduct. 204
One of the problems with the Patent Reform Act of 2005 was
the question of funding for the PTO." 5 The Act's proposal to take
the burden completely off the courts and place it with the PTO
means that funding may have to increase to support the changes.
Although these changes would increase the workload of the PTO,
the bill proposes funding changes to at least partially pay for it
rather than leaving the question open: Section 14 allows the PTO
to retain any fees it collects.20 6 Additionally, the PTO can roll over
any money it does not spend to the next fiscal year through the
creation of a revolving fund."27
B. Legislative Commentary
Senator Kyl stated that inequitable conduct in its current form is

203. S. 3600, at §ll(a).
204. Id. ("[T]he Director may levy a civil penalty against the party that
committed such misconduct.").
205. McEwen, supra note 166, at 74.
206. S. 3600, at §14(b)(1)(B)(ii).
207. Id. at §14(c)(1).
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failing to produce its intended results." 8 Its goal is to give
applicants an incentive to be forthcoming with the PTO, however
its current application - raised as a defense in a majority of
litigated patent cases - indicates more sinister motives on the part
of defendants and their attorneys. 9 In introducing the Act,
Senator Kyl pointed out that the current application of inequitable
conduct gives accused infringers an opportunity to force patent
owners to incur significant discovery and litigation costs, often for
claims that are not material to the validity of the patents or the
ongoing litigation. 1°
Senator Kyl also pointed out the problem with the inconsistency
of the materiality standard and the harsh consequences for owners,
whether they are the inventors or purchasers:
Because inequitable conduct is a court-enforced
doctrine, the assessment of what is material - of
what would have been important to a reasonable
patent examiner - is made by a U.S. district judge.
But district judges very rarely have any firsthand
knowledge of the patent-prosecution process or the
workings of the PTO and are not in a position to
accurately assess what information actually would
have been important to a reasonable examiner.

The Federal courts' sometimes hair-trigger
assessments of materiality are a substantial injustice
to those patent owners who lose the right to enforce
what is an otherwise perfectly valid patent. This
injustice can be particularly acute when the current
owner of the patent is a good-faith purchaser who is
not even alleged to have engaged in any type of

208. 154 CONG. REc. S9991 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
209. Id. ("[T]he doctrine gives the accused infringer an opportunity to
examine the inventor-often in the jury's presence-and to paint him as
deceptive and dishonest.").
210. Id.
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misconduct himself 21
Senator Kyl stated that the proposed changes are consistent with
the history of inequitable conduct decisions in the courts.1
Additionally, the changes will not only continue to impose a duty
of good faith and candor before the PTO, they will improve the
quality and increase the quantity of information at the disposal of
patent examiners in the initial prosecution proceedings:
The current state of inequitable conduct
enforcement leads applicants to adopt one of two
tactics: either they flood the Office with prior-art
references but offer no explanation of how the
invention is distinguished from that prior art or
which prior art is most relevant, since by providing
the reference they cannot be accused of concealing
it, and by providing no explanation they cannot be
of
misleading
the
Office
or
accused
mischaracterizing the information, or applicants
provide no information at all with their
applications, since providing some information
would inevitably mean not supplying other
information in the universe of existing information
and thus could open the applicant to charges of
having concealed something in that universe of
information not provided.,13
Thus, according to Senator Kyl, the Act may limit the potential
damage of successful misconduct claims, which will encourage
truly good faith disclosure and provide less of an incentive for
defendants to raise a frivolous defense if the cost to defendants of
litigating it far outweighs the potential benefit of a finding of
unenforceability. This contrasts with the attempt of the 2007 Act
to explicitly limit the invocation of the defense. 4
211. Id.
212. Id. at S9992 (referring to Supreme Court decisions that the Federal
Circuit has relied upon in its jurisprudence).
213. Id.
214. See supra Part II.D.2.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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IV.

ANALYSIS

The inequitable conduct doctrine is broken. Rather than
encouraging honesty and material disclosure during patent
prosecution, it is a procedural litigation tool used to cast patent
holders in a negative light, drive up the costs of enforcing patents,
and subject inventors and assignees to severe consequences that
are often exceptionally disproportionate to the harm done to both
the PTO and the general public.
Senator Kyl's proposed
legislation is a clear step in the right direction to remedy these
problems. Combined with the codification of some of the
judicially interpreted elements of the doctrine that were suggested
in the 2005 and 2007 Patent Reform Acts, the changes in the Act
can bring the doctrine back in line with its stated goals of ensuring
the issuance of only valid patents by motivating honesty and
candor in proceedings before the PTO.
Reform of inequitable conduct should accomplish four things:
(1) maintain the integrity of the prosecution process without overpenalizing minor errors or innocent parties (2) ensure consistency
and predictability by codifying a standard for use by both the
Federal Circuit and the PTO (3) discourage reflexive raising of the
defense by alleged infringers as a harassing litigation tool (4)
properly fund the PTO to enact the changes. Each of these will be
examined in turn as they apply to the Patent Reform Act of 2008.
A. The Duty of Candorand the Problem of Proportional
Sanctions
Because of the ex parte nature of the patent prosecution process,
PTO examiners rely on good faith on the part of applicants." 5
Inequitable conduct doctrine ensures honesty in the process by
declaring all claims in all related patents unenforceable when a
court finds misconduct that is both material and intentional.
However, the all-or-nothing "atomic bomb" of unenforceability
offers no scalability. Any and all misconduct, regardless of
degree, gets treated equally. The process treats applicants that
215. Elizabeth Peters, Note, Are We Living In a Material World?: An
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Materiality Standard Under the Patent
Doctrineof Inequitable Conduct, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1519, 1526 (2008).
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fabricate an entire suite of patent applications the same as
applicants that mistakenly rely on the established prosecution
practices of their firms and the memory and collaboration of PTO
examiners, as seen in McKesson.216

The ultimate goal of this

process should be valid, enforceable patents. The forced reissue
proceeding proposed in the Act offers a wider range of
punishments that range from unenforceability to fines, which
allows valid claims to remain enforceable when they are
untouched by allegations of misconduct.
Retaining the courts as a gatekeeper to the PTO is a sound
strategy. Under the Act, the district courts make the initial finding
of inequitable conduct,217 and then the matter gets referred to the
PTO for a reissue proceeding where the validity of the claims in
the patent will be evaluated.
The existing system entails
exhaustive examination of the allegations of misconduct raised in
the defendant's counterclaim, as the burden of proof is "clear and
convincing evidence."218 This can be an expensive proposition for

plaintiffs, as they have to pay attorneys, dig up records and
documents often years or decades old, and depose engineers,
scientists, and prosecuting attorneys.2"9 Those people may have
little memory of the initial prosecution and may not even be
affiliated with the inventor anymore. Finally, in the case of thirdparty assignees the assignee has to collaborate with the patentee to
ensure the enduring validity of their investment. The patentee
must revisit a patent in which it no longer has a vested interest in,
and its cooperation is only ensured by the possibility that the
assignee could file a fraud complaint. Avoiding this costly process
remains a powerful incentive for patentees to make all good faith,
material disclosures to the PTO even without the sword of
mandatory unenforceability hanging over their heads.
The proposed reissue proceeding in the Act is a novel idea that
continues to punish misconduct while allowing useful inventions
to remain protected by patents when the degree of wrongdoing
216. See supra Part II.B.
217. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11 (2008).
218. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
219. See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 18, at 165.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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falls short of "exceptional ' 22' and the claims in the patent are either
unaffected by the transgressions or repairable in the codified
process. In doing so, the Act wisely shifts the emphasis of the
doctrine away from punishment to the continued validity of claims
and patents as a whole by allowing valid claims to reissue. By
forcing patentees to cancel claims or substitute one claim of equal
or lesser scope, it creates a new remedy for inequitable conduct
that falls into the category of willful ignorance or negligence and is
not tantamount to fraud.
The reissue proposal is a positive change because it truly limits
unenforceability to clear, obvious intent to defraud the PTO and
the public. Lower standards of intent to deceive, as shown
above, 22 are an attorney's failure to foresee the level of interoffice communication at the PTO and the limits on the memory of
an examiner in McKesson and the use of an improper verb tense in
Hoffmann-La Roche.222 In both cases there may have been intent
to mislead; however, it is also true in both cases that the material
information existed in the record before the PTO. The manner of
presentation was deemed material and intentional. The changes
proposed by the Act allow patentees in similar situations to simply
reformulate the information in the reissue proceeding and keep the
market rights to their inventions. By adding a distinction between
these kinds of errors and things like perjury, forgery, and
intentionally withholding obvious prior art, the Act encourages
honest disclosure, continues to harshly penalize brazen
misconduct, invalidates bad claims or patents, and allows valid
claims in patents to remain protected.
It can also be argued that extreme consequences are just the
deterrent that the system needs to "maintain the integrity of, and
continuing public confidence in, the U.S. patent system. ' ' 2 3 If
there is a perception that there are already too many bad patents in

220.
221.
222.
223.

S. 3600, at § 11.
See supra Part lI.B.
Id.
Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine Worth Saving,
at
2,
Sept.
23,
2008,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article = 1003&context=-lisadolak
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the marketplace,224 then it may not be wise to weaken sanctions
because any risk of increased deception before the PTO and the
issuance of more bad patents is unacceptable. However, the Act
does not take unenforceability off the table. It merely reserves it
for clear misconduct or claims that should not have been issued in
the first place. If the misconduct does not affect patentability,
valid claims can remain enforceable.
Another positive change is limiting sanctions to parties that
participate in misconduct before the PTO.225 Under the current
regime, deceptive practices by anyone at any part of the
prosecution process can result in unenforceability. If inventors
misrepresent the results of an experiment to an attorney, the patent
can be held unenforceable. If the patent attorney, as in HoffmannLa Roche,2 26 combines two experiments into one and anticipates
the results, the patent can likewise be held unenforceable. The text
of the Act states "the Director may levy a civil penalty against the
' which at least limits
party that committed such misconduct,"227
fines to the offending parties as opposed to unenforceability,
which affects everyone with a financial interest in the patent.
One possible objection to the reissue proposal is that it creates
the potential for an infinite loop of modifications to a patent if the
same patent faces multiple independent challenges of inequitable
conduct. If the patent survives the reissue proceeding with one
modified claim in an enforceable patent, what happens the next
time an alleged infringer sues for misconduct in prosecution or
even worse, misconduct during the issuance of the modified
claim? Presumably the PTO would take prior allegations into
account when evaluating a reissue application under these
circumstances, especially since after the first reissue there is no
longer the potential for a third-party problem. During the reissue
proceeding, sanctions are only available for the party that
committed the misconduct.228 If an assignee participates in the
reissue, then going forward it would be liable for any misconduct,
224.
System
225.
226.
227.
228.

See Lisa A. Dolak & Blaine T. Bettinger, The United States Patent
in the Media Mirror,58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459, 488 (2008).
S. 3600, at § 11.
See supra Part II.B.
S. 3600, at § 11.
Id.
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either in the form of fines or invalidated claims. This should
hopefully serve as a deterrent to the unlikely scenario that a district
court finds inequitable conduct and the PTO reissues a patent, only
to have another district court find inequitable conduct in that
reissue proceeding. And because the reissue proceeding evaluates
all the claims in the patent, 229 that initial scrutiny should lessen the
chances of future successful, independent allegations of
misconduct. In theory it is possible for multiple re-issuances of
the same patent, but in practice, misconduct should be deterred or
weeded out by the first reissue proceeding.
The addition of the reissue proceeding to supplement the
existing court determination of inequitable conduct ensures that
valuable inventions remain patented while continuing to give a
strong incentive to applicants to provide comprehensive, honest,
material disclosures to the PTO during prosecution. The Act's
proposed changes appropriately mitigate the harsh remedy of
unenforceability for any and all court findings of inequitable
conduct by replacing it with a scalable system ranging from fines
to invalidated claims that adds much needed proportionality to the
doctrine and ensures that only the wrongdoers are punished.
B. Materiality,Intent to Deceive, and Predictability
The standard of materiality and the balancing test with the intent
element have long been inconsistently applied by the courts,
leading to a complete lack of predictability that leaves applicants
wondering both what exactly they need to disclose during
prosecution and whether their subjective intent even matters when
balanced with a clear and convincing showing of materiality. The
Digital Control decision is a particularly good example of the
confusion regarding materiality because the court not only failed to
limit itself to the pre-1992 and post-1992 standards of materiality
but opined that any of five different standards was acceptable to
apply. 230
The problem with an inconsistent materiality standard is that
patentees only know what "material" means during the application
process before the PTO. That standard, defined in Rule 56 of the
229. Id.
230. See supra Part II.B.
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Federal Code of Federal Regulations,"' gives applicants guidance
about what they need to disclose to comply with their duty of good
faith and candor. Even if they fail to disclose all necessary
materials to an examiner, they can at least make what they believe
is a good faith effort. If the courts apply a different standard, how
can applicants make good faith disclosures when they do not know
what "material" means to a future court in some future challenge
to their conduct before the PTO?
As Senator Kyl stated in introducing the Act,232 applicants use
one of two extreme strategies to avoid misconduct allegations: (1)
they deluge the PTO with disclosures, hoping to err on the side of
over-inclusion so that they are not accused of omitting material
information, or (2) they deliberately omit any prior art references,
anticipating that if one reference is included, the failure to include
any other reference might imply intent to hide it from the PTO.
Again, the goal is to encourage good faith disclosure to give PTO
examiners the opportunity to make informed decisions about
patentability, but the current system instead forces applicants to
play strategic games with disclosures to avoid misconduct
allegations. If the inequitable conduct system led to greater
predictability, applicants that want to make good faith disclosures
would be enabled to do so.
The Act makes that possible by codifying the post-1992
standard for the courts to use before they send allegations of
misconduct to the PTO for the reissue proceeding. The court must
find it more likely than not that the party intentionally submitted or
concealed material information, and then the Act defines
materiality as relating to patentability.233 This aligns the courts
with the expectations of the PTO, and also produces further
predictability for patentees in that the post-1992 standard is an
objective test. Patentees would no longer lose patents due to a
court's subjective interpretation of what it determines a reasonable
examiner would find material during prosecution. This change is
essential to give applicants notice of what is expected of them at
both prosecution and in inequitable conduct litigation. By giving
231. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1) (2008).
232. 154 CONG. REc. S9991 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
233. S. 3600, at § 11.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/4
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them notice of their expected conduct and level of disclosure, it
gives them a real chance to comply with their duty before the PTO
and makes future enforcement of breaches of that duty easier for
the PTO because applicants carmot claim to be unaware or
confused about expected behavior.
There is no mention of dates in the Act which might raise a
problem with the expectations of patent applicants while
prosecuting their patents prior to 1992. If they submitted those
applications with any thought to the "reasonable examiner"
standard used by the PTO at that time, their expectations could be
frustrated by being held to a different standard of materiality years
after their applications were processed. However, given the propatentee nature of the post-1992 objective test mandated by the
Act, it seems unlikely that patentees would object to the change.
Another, more significant problem is that material misconduct
that does not affect patentability would not necessarily be punished
as severely under the Act as it is now. The reissue proceeding
focuses on patentability, so if a patentee lies to the PTO
throughout the process but the misrepresentations do not affect the
validity of claims, the question remains whether the consequences
for that conduct would be harsh enough to act as a deterrent to
future applicants. Under the Act, once the PTO determines that
there was misconduct, it weighs three factors to determine the
sanction, one of which is "the impact of the misconduct on the
'
integrity of matters or proceedings before the Office."234
However,
only in the case of fraud does invalidation of claims come into
play. If the patentee's acts are misconduct that needs to be
strongly deterred but they have little to do with the validity of the
patent and fall short of fraud, the sole sanction is fines. While up
to a $1 million fine is hardly insignificant, it is unfortunate that a
strong showing of intent to deceive the PTO may not be enough to
carry consequences to the patent.
However, this is a necessary byproduct of the Act's focus on
patentability and proportionality of penalties. By choosing the
post-1992 materiality standard, the Act removes the subjective
uncertainty inherent in the reasonable examiner standard and puts
materiality to patentability at the heart of the reissue proceeding.

234. Id.
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Since the reissue proceeding modifies, deletes, or invalidates
claims, there is no scalable way to tie immaterial deception to
specific claims in the patent in question. Without that relationship
between conduct and claims, unenforceability of the patent as a
whole becomes the only available penalty, and that would continue
the proportional sanctions problem from the current regime
because forgery related to patentability could result in a reissued
patent while perjury unrelated to any claims could result in an
unenforceable patent. If this system is implemented, Congress and
the PTO will have to hope that the fines for immaterial deception
that falls short of fraud are enough to motivate honesty and good
faith before the PTO.
Aligning the materiality standard of the PTO with that now
imposed on the courts brings much needed predictability to
inequitable conduct and gives applicants a clear idea of what
standard of disclosure they will be held to in proceedings before
both the PTO and the courts.
C. Use as a Litigation Tool Rather Than Incentivefor Good
Conduct
In the Federal Circuit, opinion after opinion refers to the
'
reflexive raising of inequitable conduct as a "plague."235
The Act,
36
unlike its 2005 antecedent,
does not expressly limit the
circumstances in which a defendant can raise it in response to a
claim of infringement. Instead, the Act appears to combat this
problem by limiting the situations in which a patent will be found
unenforceable. This removes the incentive for automatically
raising inequitable conduct as a defense.
Under the Act, the reissue proceeding allows patents to remain
enforceable if patentees' misconduct falls short of fraud.237 Since
patents will remain valid (and defendants can still be found liable
235. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting), reh 'g en banc denied, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 25103 (Sept. 25, 2008); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega
Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J. dissenting);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
236. See supra Part II.D. 1.
237. S. 3600, at § 11.
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for infringement) in all except the most egregious cases of
deception before the PTO, alleged infringers have no motivation to
raise the defense most of the time. Under the current regime,
inequitable conduct can be found that is short of fraud,2 38 and the
result is an unenforceable patent (and a defendant that is off the
hook for infringement), so it benefits alleged infringers to raise the
defense and see if it sticks. However, absent a discovery of
exceptional deception, the costs of litigating an inequitable
conduct claim will not be worth it for defendants if the outcome of
the process is a stronger, reissued patent.
The side effect of the Act is that if there is less motivation to
raise the defense, then there will be fewer instances of true
misconduct that go through the court system and arrive back at the
PTO for sanctions and modified patent claims. If a patentee
obtains a patent through deceit short of fraud, there is less
incentive for a defendant infringer to litigate the issue because
there is no benefit to the defendant if a patent reissues and the
patentee is fined. While this moves inequitable conduct toward the
true fraud standard advocated by some,239 it also moves it away
from its origins as conduct that was more than just fraud.
Additionally, it creates an incentive for the PTO to catch more
deception during prosecution, which is good because then the
public would be protected from bad patents without having to wait
for someone to litigate.
The changes proposed by the Act will likely decrease the
quantity of frivolous inequitable conduct claims, but they also give
rise to a possible underenforcement problem where some types of
misconduct leading to questionably valid patent claims could go
uninvestigated and unpunished.
D. Fundingand Fines
When the 2005 Act was proposed, there were some general
concerns about the ability of the PTO to handle the entire burden

238. See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 18, at 149-50.
239. Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating "my
reading of our case law restricts a finding of inequitable conduct to only the

most extreme cases of fraud and deception").
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of policing inequitable conduct within its existing budget.24 ° The
2008 Act at least attempts to mitigate those concerns with the
proposal to create a revolving fund that allows the PTO to keep the
fines it collects. 241' By avoiding fee diversion, the Act's funding
changes may allow inequitable conduct reform to pay for itself.
Most significantly, the district courts remain the initial step in
the application of inequitable conduct, and it must find material
and intentional wrongdoing before the PTO becomes involved.
The gatekeeper role of the court shields the PTO from not only
frivolous claims, but all claims that do not rise to the level of
misconduct. This difference with the proposed changes in the
2005 Act will greatly reduce the number of actions the PTO will
have to address through the reissue proceeding because the PTO
does not have to administer the whole process and some claims
have been weeded out. This is especially important given the
reflexive raising of inequitable conduct in infringement suits,
although under the Act that may slow.
Additionally, by applying joint and several liability to any fines
leveled on patentees for misconduct, the Act ensures that any party
to the misconduct that has the resources to pay the fine it could be
responsible for the entirety of the penalty. The PTO should be
able to collect the full amounts even if the attorneys or patentees
are in bankruptcy or the patentee is a small entity without the
capital to pay a substantial penalty.
Because the amount of incoming funding from fines each year
will vary depending on the amount and degree of misconduct, it
remains possible that the PTO will need to find additional funding
to support the proposed changes, such as higher fees. However,
with fines ranging from up to $150,000 for smaller degrees of
misconduct 24 2 to $10 million for egregious misconduct, 243 the Act
is an improvement on its predecessors in that it at least proposes a
way to pay for itself.

240. McEwen, supra note 166, at 74.
241. S. 3600, at§ 11.
242. Id.
243. Id
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E. Court Decisions Revisited
Given the proposed changes in the Patent Reform Act of 2008, it
is useful to see how this system works with previous decisions of
interest, particularly Purdue Pharma, McKesson, and Applied
Materials.
In Purdue Pharma, the patentee lost a patent to a popular pain
reliever that accounted for seventy-five percent of its business and
forced a significant workplace reduction.2 44 After a petition for
rehearing, the Federal Circuit revisited the opinion and changed
the weight it gave to the materiality and intent elements, as the
court initially felt the clear showing of materiality overrode the
less obvious intent to deceive. 45
Under the proposed changes, the district court's initial finding of
inequitable conduct would then go to the PTO for the reissue
Instead of spending time and money trying to
proceeding.
convince the Federal Circuit to find that the district court's
decision was clearly erroneous, the patentee could substitute the
claim that contained the misleading "surprising discovery"
language with one that remedied the problem. Then, the PTO
could either find that there was a lack of probable cause to find
inequitable conduct or it could reissue the patent with the modified
claim. The PTO could also declare the patent unenforceable like
the Federal Circuit initially did, but that remedy is only available
in the Act for exceptional acts of misconduct that affect the
integrity of the PTO, which the patentee's misleading language
clearly did not do.
In McKesson, the patentee lost two patents when it failed to
communicate information about co-pending applications to both
PTO examiners that were evaluating the applications, and it relied
The
on an examiner to remember a previous prosecution.
significance of the decision in the context of the Act is that the
unenforceability of the patents turned on the inner workings of the
PTO and the patentee's duty to remind the office of information
that it already had. While it may be possible for the court to define
that duty and it may even be reasonable to force applicants to err
on the side of over-disclosure, however the PTO is obviously in a
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. Id.
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better position to evaluate this kind of conduct because it is the
agency in question.
Under the Act, that is exactly what would have happened. The
patentee would have taken the district court's determination to the
patent office and at least hoped that it would find a lack of
probable cause in its conduct. Failing that, the patentee could
either modify the claims to contain the missing information or
cancel the claims relating to the three-node communication system
in question. In either case, lack of foresight falling short of fraud
would not render the patents protecting the patentee's inventions
unenforceable. Additionally, the conduct in question was the
omissions of the attorney during the prosecution process. The
patentee corporation had nothing to do with what was essentially a
procedural error on the part of the attorney, yet the corporation lost
the patents. While corporations are sometimes liable for the
actions of others acting within the scope of employment, 46 in this
case the reissue proceeding and variable sanctions in the Act
ensure that patentees like McKesson will not necessarily lose their
patents for conduct to which they are barely a party.
Contrast those results with Applied Materials, where the
patentee forged the signature of a dead inventor in two responses
to the PTO.2 47

The district court applied the "reasonable

examiner" standard in that case, which is different from the
materiality standard proposed in the Act. The standard in the Act
requires material conduct to relate to patentability, which the
forgeries did not; they related to inventorship. However, the
district court can also send the matter to the reissue proceeding if
the party "knowingly and intentionally deceived the Office by
concealing material information or by submitting false material
information in such matter or proceeding.

2 48

The forged

signatures seem to fit under "submitting false information."
Since the deception also appears to have been intentional, the
PTO would likely find misconduct just as the court did. Then it
246. Vicarious liability is liability that a supervisory party (such as an
employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate (such as an
employee) based on the relationship between the two parties. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004).
247. See supra Part II.B.
248. S. 3600, at § 11.
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would weigh the three factors and determine a sanction.249 The
patents could still be held unenforceable if the PTO finds the
misconduct rose to the level of fraud,25° otherwise, the two forged
signatures and trial testimony disputing the date of the inventor's
death could be found to be a "pattern of misconduct" that results in
a fine of up to $1 million. Given the knowing forgery of the
signatures, the misconduct should be classified as affecting the
integrity of the PTO and the patent should, as in the district court
decision, be held unenforceable. Even though the forgeries did not
affect patentability, the Act provides a way to sanction and deter
this kind of behavior.
V. CONCLUSION

Inequitable conduct reform is long overdue, and the notorious
"plague" of automatically raising inequitable conduct as a defense
to allegations of infringement has long been a scourge to patentees
in litigation. The Patent Reform Act of 2008 proposes many
positive changes to the doctrine that should be enacted to continue
to motivate candor before the PTO while continuing to harshly
penalize truly egregious conduct. Specifically, the proposed
reissue proceeding before the PTO allows misconduct that does
not affect validity to be punished without invalidating all related
patents, which both motivates appropriate disclosure and allows
patentees to retain their rights to worthy inventions. Significantly,
it also proposes a way to pay for its changes by allowing the PTO
to keep the fines it levies against offending parties.
The Act may also allow some misconduct to go undiscovered or
unpunished in two ways. First, the post-1992 materiality standard
focuses on misconduct related to patentability, so immaterial
misconduct may not be deterred to the degree it is now. Second,
because unenforceability is unavailable for any conduct that falls
short of fraud and that removes the incentive for defendants to
raise the defense in most cases, there is no mechanism to bring
lesser misconduct to the attention of the PTO. However, with the
focus on patentability and with the harshest sanctions reserved for
egregious behavior, some ordinarily sanctionable parties may have
249. Id.
250. Id.
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to fall out to realize the benefits of the new system as a whole.
Sanctions that are proportional to the level of wrongdoing and
greater predictability from prosecution to litigation are the two
greatest features to the proposed changes. Together, these changes
will bring much needed stability to the prosecution process by
giving applicants a clearer idea of what inequitable conduct is and
remove the need for any intentional under- or over-disclosure that
is less about the patents at issue and more about creating a record
that can be used against them in a future inequitable conduct
proceeding. The Federal Circuit has applied the doctrine with an
eye to protecting the public and the competitive marketplace from
bad patents; this system continues to strive for that protection
while limiting the harsh remedy of unenforceability to patents that
are obtained by fraud on the PTO and the public.
-Matthew M Peters
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